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I.  Introduction 
The legal profession is facing profound and perhaps irreversible changes.  Whether you 
view these striking demographics as a “crisis” likely depends on the location of your perch.  If 
you are a tenured professor at a T14 law school or a senior partner at an NLJ 250 firm, you may 
view the trends we have been discussing today as cyclical corrections.  If you are an unemployed 
graduate looking for work or an untenured professor at a lower-tier school that is struggling to 
stay afloat, you may be more likely to view these trends as permanent and paradigm shifting. 
While applications to American law school have been steadily dropping since 2005, the 
last three years have seen the most dramatic changes.  Between 2010 and 2012, the total number 
of applicants to U.S. law schools decreased by 25%.1  This year alone-- 2012-2013--the number 
of applicants dropped another 19%.2  By 2014, the legal academy may for the first time face an 
open enrollment situation where the total number of available seats exceeds the number of 
applicants. 
Most law schools have responded to this sharp application decline in one of two ways.  
Many schools have dramatically reduced their class sizes, which entails foregoing tuition 
revenue.  Lower gross revenue means schools must seek out opportunities to cut costs.  Other 
schools have kept their class sizes relatively stable by offering more scholarship assistance to 
attract students (essentially increasing their discount rates).  This approach too requires 
expenditure cuts, because absent additional non-tuition sources of funding (such as gifts or 
endowment) spending more money on scholarships means spending less money on something 
else.  
 Law schools cannot make up for this lost revenue by continuing to raise their tuitions at 
rates that far outpace inflation.  A continued upward spiral in tuition threatens to further 
exacerbate the downward spiral in applications.  On average, law school tuition in the United 
States increased 375% at private law schools and 820% at public law schools between 1985 and 
                                                 
* Professor and Law School Fund Scholar, Boston College Law School. 
1 Law School Admissions Council and American Bar Association, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA 
ACCREDITED LAW SCHOOLS 2012 EDITION.  
2 LSAC Resources—Current Volume Data (as of 2/15/13),  available at 
http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/three-year-volume.asp. 
2009.3  During this 25 year period, law schools on average increased their tuition between 6-15% 
each year, while inflation averaged only 3%.  By way of comparison, tuition for MBA students 
at our nation’s top management schools increased only 80% in the past decade, an average 
increase of 4-6% per year.4  Reining in the law school tuition spiral is critical to restoring 
consumer confidence in the value of the product we are selling-- especially in a climate where 
the job prospects for the graduates of some law schools are increasingly bleak.5  
Legal educators are now engaged in some very difficult and painful conversations about 
the financial model of legal education.  Schools that take an ostrich-like approach to this 
challenge risk becoming obsolete or irrelevant. What follows are seven proposed changes to the 
structure of legal education that could simultaneously reduce overall costs to law students,6 and 
improve the quality of their education.  Quality is not always synonymous with price.  With 
vision and lots of hard work, it may be possible to do more with less. 
Three of my proposals will require amendments to ABA accreditation standards.  The 
political and institutional climate now seems ripe to make these reforms.  Many ABA 
accreditation standards are perceived to impede experimentation and innovation in legal 
education, and to primarily benefit academics (who largely have captured the accreditation 
process) over students and the practicing bar.   The President of the American Bar Association 
has recently appointed a “Task Force on the Future of Legal Education” that is looking at the 
structural and economic models of legal education, and the impact of rising tuition and falling 
employment rates on crushing student debt.7 The Task Force is soliciting comments and 
testimony from all sectors of the profession, and some of its members have predicted “bold” and 
perhaps even “radical” reform.8  My hope is that several of the proposals presented at today’s 
symposium will be submitted for consideration by the Task Force in the critical months ahead.  
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II.  Seven Affordability Initiatives  
A.   Varying the Three Year Model   
In FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, Brian Tamanaha has argued for increased differentiation 
among law schools as to mission and focus.  Some law schools should retain their focus on 
research and scholarship, while others should see themselves primarily as trade schools engaged 
in the professional preparation of lawyers.9  I would encourage differentiation of another sort. 
More law schools should differentiate internally, and establish several paths available to their 
students for a J.D. degree.  Rather than offering students a one- size- fits- all three year, full time 
J.D. model, law schools should allow students to complete the J.D. degree in two years, three 
years, or four years (as described below) with alternate routes selected by students at the end of 
their first year primarily based on considerations of career interests and available finances. 
 A two-year J.D. would be designed primarily for students who intend to practice 
government or public interest law after graduation, and therefore are the most acutely sensitive to 
taking on substantial debt. The degree would be completed in five semesters (two full academic 
years plus the summer in between).10  The summer after the first year, the students in this 
program would take on-line courses that have been created by videotaping prior in-person class 
sessions, coupled by carefully crafted faculty review questions and on-line discussion threads.  
Prime courses that should be considered for such summer on-line instruction would be traditional 
second-year core courses such as Corporations, Evidence, Administrative Law and Federal 
Taxation.  The students would be charged on a per credit basis for these on-line courses, at a 
substantially reduced rate compared to taking the same course live during the regular academic 
year due to the lower cost to the law school in terms of delivery.  Such an “on-line” summer 
program could save participating students 25% of their overall cost of J.D. tuition, by eliminating 
one semester and reducing the cost of a second semester by up to one half.11 
 ABA accreditation standards could accommodate this “2 1/2 year” plan with two minor 
amendments.12  First, the number of overall credit hours required for completion of the J.D. 
degree would have to be reduced from 83 to 80.13  Second, the maximum number of “distance 
education” credits the student could take toward a J.D. degree would need to be increased from 
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12 to 14 credits. 14 Both changes are eminently reasonable, and indeed quite modest.  A student 
would be able to complete the “2 1/2 year” program by taking 16 credits each semester of her 
first year, 14 on-line credits during the summer, and 17 credits each semester during her second 
year.   This model would provide a lower-cost gateway to the profession for students intending to 
serve low income clients, at a time when the availability of legal services for the poor and middle 
class in the United States is being seriously threatened by rapidly declining law school 
enrollments.  Law Schools might consider limiting admission to this program to students 
committed to public interest or government service.  
  My “4 year” model would essentially take the traditional three year J.D. program, and 
add a paid apprenticeship between the second and third year, during which participating students 
would spend a year away from the law school in gainful law-related employment.  One way to 
think of this is an optional “gap year” for law students.  The economic advantage of this model 
would be that students would be able to earn money to help pay for the third year of law 
school.15 They should also be allowed to lock in their third year tuition at the rate applicable 
upon their departure.  The pedagogical advantages are twofold: 1) it would provide them with 
hands-on experience applying the concepts and skills they learned in their first two years of law 
school, and 2) it would help them better assess their strengths and interests, so that they could 
come back to law school with a renewed sense of purpose and a greater focus on what final 
courses might be essential for their intended career path.  This “4 year model” might be 
particularly attractive for students who finish the second year of law school without any firm 
direction about their vocation, and uncertain about the advisability of undertaking an expensive 
third year of study until they gain more focus.   
 Of course, one prerequisite to the viability of such a four year model is the availability of 
apprenticeships to fill the “gap” year.  By “apprenticeship,” I envision a salaried position at a 
small to mid-size law firm or a corporate general counsel’s office, performing functions 
somewhere between the level of paralegal and entry level associate at a salary of roughly 
$45,000 per year.  In an economy where close to 45% of law school graduates nationwide are 
presently unable to find full-time legal work nine months after graduation,16 one might 
reasonably question why employers would hire a current student at $45,000 per year when they 
could hire an unemployed but already licensed attorney for $60,00017 to do similar work?  In 
addition to the possible $15,000 cost savings, I think there are two other incentives for law firms 
to hire apprentices. The first is flexibility.  Small to mid-size firms with fewer resources and no 
formal hiring or training programs may be willing to take on an apprentice to help with a 
complex litigation matter or a large but short term transactional project, when they would be 
reluctant to commit to hiring a full-time employee due to uncertainty about future business.  The 
second reason is loyalty to the law school.  Prominent alumni in small to mid-size law firms may 
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be willing to mentor apprentices as a way to give back to the law school, and to help their alma 
mater experiment with a new and exciting model of legal education.  If Career Services and 
Externship Directors cultivated relationships with appropriate alumni, it is possible that each 
year they could identify 10-20 employers willing to participate.  If the initial experiment is 
successful, that number may grow over time.   
Notwithstanding the availability of these new 2 ½ and 4 year paths to a J.D., perhaps the 
majority of law students will continue to select a traditional three year course of study. Students 
in this category might include those students who are elected to law review, those who are 
successful in securing remunerative summer employment after their second year that leads to a 
full-time job offer, and students who are receiving substantial assistance from others in financing 
their legal education.  The availability and perhaps continued prominence of the three- year 
model would not diminish our responsibility to curtail tuition costs even for traditional students, 
in some of the manners I will describe below in proposals 2-7.  Moreover, law schools must 
redouble their efforts to make the third year experience pedagogically valuable for traditional 
J.D. candidates, by offering a competencies- based curriculum with carefully crafted simulation, 
practical skills and capstone courses.18   
B. Allow for Paid Externships   
The ABA prohibits a law student from receiving both pay and credit for the same 
externship.19    This “no-pay rule,” implemented in 1979 and retained after further study in 1983, 
is unique in professional education.  Among professional schools, only law, pharmacy and 
nutrition schools enforce such a limitation.20  Allowing law students—like business, accounting 
and engineering students—to “earn while they learn” would help them keep down the net costs 
of their legal education and thereby reduce debt.   
 The concerns that prompted the ABA to retain the “no pay” rule in 1983 no longer seem 
very persuasive.  Professor James Backman at Brigham Young has summarized these concerns 
as follows:  fear of drawing student interest and financial resources away from in-house clinics 
serving the poor; worries about faculty being able to control the learning objectives in a paid 
externship, where there may be a stronger conflict of allegiance between the employer and the 
educator; and, a concern that employer will not allow students to participate in important 
formational experiences that cannot be billed to a client (shadowing meetings, court appearances, 
depositions,  etc.).21   Professor Backman makes a powerful case that the concerns that prompted 
the ABA to retain the “no pay rule” in 1983 no longer exist:  in-house clinics are on surer 
financial footing at most law schools, and their faculty have greater job security; standards for 
awarding credit for study outside the classroom are far more detailed and comprehensive  in 
terms of quality assurance;22 and, faculty can still control the learning objectives in paid 
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externships by setting up a detailed commitment letter with the supervisor specifying the types of  
work and opportunities the students will be provided.23   
Moreover, the “no pay” rule disadvantages students from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds.  If law students are forced to choose between a part time paying job outside the 
legal profession (such as working as a barista at a coffee shop) or a legal externship, some will 
be forced to choose the former in order to pay their living expenses.  This may lead students 
from more modest means to forego valuable externship opportunities that will give them the 
necessary experience, credentials and contacts to obtain a full-time legal job following 
graduation.  
If employers have a choice to pay externs or not to pay externs, one might argue that they 
will reflexively choose the “no pay” option, and therefore little benefit will inure to law students 
by making a change to Standard 305.  But many legal employers have been reluctant to take on 
unpaid externs due to fear of violating the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.  The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has issued detailed guidelines 
setting forth six criteria for determining when educational internships may be hosted by for-
profit organizations without providing compensation.  Criterion # 4 specifies that the activities of 
the intern must provide “no immediate advantage” to the employer.24  Some law firms are 
reluctant to take on unpaid externs for fear of violating this provision.25  Allowing for paid legal 
externships—say, up to 200% of the prevailing minimum wage—might thus end up increasing 
the pool of available opportunities for law students.  Moreover, a 2009 survey by the 
organization “Intern Bridge” found that both employers and students derived greater satisfaction 
from paid internships than unpaid internships; the students found the assignments more 
meaningful, and the employers found performance on assignments to be of higher quality.26  
C.  Vary Teaching Loads 
Some commentators have predicted that many law schools will be forced to contain costs 
by increasing the teaching loads of full-time faculty members.27  For example, professors at 
many top-tier law schools presently teach three courses per year (roughly 10 credits).  If those 
same professors were required to teach four courses per year (roughly 12 credits), certain faculty 
slots could go unfilled upon retirement over the next decade, and some stipends currently paid to 
adjuncts professors could be eliminated.   
Rather than increase teaching loads across the board, my proposal would be to 
differentiate among faculty in their annual course assignments depending on their productivity in 
other academic endeavors (most notably scholarship).  Course loads have been reduced at many 
law schools over the past two decades in order to give faculty more time for research and 
writing.28  Yet even after this across-the-board course relief, not all faculty members at all law 
schools have become productive scholars.  Faculty play many roles, and not all of them equally 
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well.  At many law schools there are highly effective teachers who do not engage in substantial 
research.  Those faculty members should be utilized more effectively by being assigned an 
additional course per year.   It makes little sense, from either a cost-efficiency or utility 
perspective, to treat all faculty members equally, regardless of their strengths, interests, and 
contributions.   
Unfortunately, many schools have preferred a facially egalitarian approach to teaching 
assignments as a way to avoid the political difficulties (and wounded egos) that would result 
from differentiation.   But this only results in inequalities being forced underground—they still 
exist.  Some faculty members are both productive scholars and productive teachers; under a 
facially egalitarian teaching assignment model, they end up doing a disproportionate share of the 
work in terms of combined student contact hours and scholarly contribution.   If law schools 
react to the current affordability crisis by increasing the teaching loads of all full time faculty 
members across the board, they run two risks: 1) jeopardizing the scholarly output of their most 
productive researchers and 2) burning out their most effective classroom instructors who already 
teach heavy student loads.   
A more sensible approach to teaching assignments is to raise the presumptive teaching 
load for all full-time faculty, but then to allow individual faculty members to petition for a 
reduced course load in a particular year, depending on 1) their scholarly agenda and the likely 
success of their projects (as demonstrated by prior significant scholarly contributions) or 2) 
unusually high student contact hours.  By thus making faculty members “earn” a reduced 
teaching load, law schools could begin the difficult but critical task of varying teaching 
assignments to suit individual faculty productivity.29  Allocation of teaching responsibilities 
would then begin to more optimally reflect the different interests, talents and capabilities of 
faculty members at various points in their careers.30  
D.  Short Term Contracts: Creating a “Third Track” for Full-Time Faculty 
The traditional model of legal education is to hire, recruit and promote two categories of 
full-time faculty: clinical/ legal research and writing faculty (so-called “skills” or “experiential 
learning” faculty) and tenured/tenure-track faculty (so called “podium” faculty).  While many 
schools have eliminated the contractual distinction between these two types of faculty members 
by offering tenure to clinicians, at most schools the primary teaching responsibilities and 
research expectations for these two groups of professors continue to be different.31  What each 
group has in common, however, is longevity; both skills and podium faculty typically view law 
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teaching as a career that will span the remainder of their working lives.  In other words, these 
faculty members are wedded to us for as long as they want to be here.   
This two-track model of faculty hiring ignores an important and far more flexible source 
of legal talent.  Lawyers are living longer and retiring earlier. Many partners at major law firms 
work under partnership agreements that require them to retire at or around 62 years of age.  
Similarly, many government attorneys and judges are eligible for a public pension, depending on 
their years of service, in their early 60s.  Lots of these accomplished, talented, and still energetic 
lawyers would relish the opportunity to continue working in a law school environment as visiting 
faculty teaching and mentoring our students.  These retiring lawyers and judges still have a lot 
left to offer, and it is a missed opportunity to put them out to pasture.  
I am not talking here about hiring the seasoned old trial lawyer to come in and tell war 
stories to our students.  Some of the accomplished attorneys I am envisioning have taught at our 
law schools with distinction as adjunct faculty while they were practicing law or serving on the 
bench (with exemplary course evaluations to prove it).  With careful screening and vetting, some 
of these “full-time but short-term” hires could bring extraordinary skill sets to our communities 
as visitors, at exceptionally low cost.  
Tenure might not be “dead” as many pundits like to proclaim,32 but in an era of 
heightened attention to costs, it naturally will be limited to a smaller and smaller percentage of 
faculty.  Law Schools should thus expand their pool of potential teaching resources to create a 
third category of full time-faculty member—the distinguished visitor from practice.  Especially 
in an era where fewer and fewer tenure track faculty are being hired with significant practice 
experience,  ignoring this highly talented sector of the labor market makes little sense-- either in 
terms of cost or in terms of maximizing the professional preparation of our students. Without the 
need for sabbaticals, summer research support, or research assistants, these professors could 
teach a course load of three to four courses per year for ¼ to ½ the cost of tenure-track faculty, 
and no long term commitment.   Visitors could be awarded a series of short-term contracts (e.g. 2 
years) and retained only so long as the relationship continues to meet institutional needs.  
Many law schools have shied away from such a layered faculty hiring strategy due to 
concern about its impact on US News & World Report rankings.  Full time tenured or tenure- 
track faculty improve the school’s student- faculty ratio, and arguably have the greatest capacity 
to influence the academic reputation of the school.33  But schools need to take a bold step in 
reducing faculty costs for the benefit of their students, irrespective of its incidental effect on the 
rankings.  In other words, they should have the courage to lead the rankings indicators, rather 
than simply follow them.  And even if one views rankings as a legitimate concern, the ABA 
could certainly help here by changing the way it calculates student-faculty ratio.34 The ABA 
currently treats “visitors” (even those teaching a full course load) as .7 faculty resources rather 
than one full faculty resource, unless the visitor is covering for a regular full time faculty 
member on leave.35  More significantly, visitors are included in the ABA’s category of 
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“additional teaching resources” (along with administrators who teach and adjuncts) which is 
capped at 20% of the school’s full-time skills and podium faculty.36  Because many schools are 
already at their 20% cap in additional teaching resources, hiring more distinguished visitors from 
practice will do nothing to improve their student-faculty ratio, and may actually hurt that figure if 
visitor hiring is done in lieu of regular full time appointments. 37 The ABA should consider 
raising the “cap” on additional teaching resources in Standard 402 to 30% or 40% in order to 
encourage schools to take more creative and less costly approaches to faculty recruitment.  
E. Maximize Course Enrollments   
Another trend that drives up the cost of legal education is running low-enrollment 
courses.  I am not referring to clinics or certain simulation courses such as Trial Practice or 
Negotiation, which may need to be small in order to achieve valid pedagogical objectives.  I am 
referring to very narrow seminars that primarily advance the research interests of the instructor, 
or doctrinal “podium” courses that are being taught primarily in a lecture style to an unusually 
small audience.  It is very uncommon for Deans or Associate Deans to cancel scheduled courses 
due to limited enrollments, for fear of embarrassing the professor or upsetting the expectations of 
enrolled students.  But here, law schools need to learn a lesson from the airline industry. Just as it 
is not cost efficient to run planes with half empty seats, it is not cost efficient to run classes with 
half empty desks.  Airlines have closely scrutinized consumer travel patterns over time and 
reorganized their routes and schedules to optimize efficiency; law schools must do the same sort 
of rigorous analysis with regard to course preferences and enrollments.   
My proposal here is threefold.   First, law schools must have the courage to cancel 
seminars and doctrinal courses that are under-subscribed (e.g., under 8 students), forcing the 
professor to offer an alternative course either in that semester or in the following semester.  
Second, law schools should offer certain doctrinal courses that typically enroll between 9-15 
students (for example, a Conflicts of Law or Admiralty course) on an every-other-year schedule.  
If this matrix were planned in advance and adequately published to students, they would know 
that if they wished to take a certain course they must do so in their second year, or it would not 
be offered again before they graduate.  Finally, law schools in urban environments with other 
law schools nearby should develop “target” enrollments for each class, and work out a 
consortium agreement with partner law schools whereby students outside the host law school 
would be allowed to register for open classes after the internal registration period had closed if 
the target enrollment had not been reached.  Such a consortium agreement could operate on a 
balance of payments model, where the outside students did not pay any additional tuition, but the 
consortium members work out a per-credit exchange at the end of each year depending on how 
many outside students took courses at each school.  Such an exchange, over time, would 
                                                 
36 See ABA Standard 401, Interpretation 402-1(1). 
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encourage law schools to play to their subject matter strengths in making curricular decisions, 
rather than trying to satisfy a full panoply of student interests.  
F. Expand Seats in Clinical Programs through Use of Teaching Fellowships   
Law schools face pressure to cut costs at the same time that they face pressure to expand 
their practical skills offerings.  Yet one of the prime drivers of the tuition spiral (in addition to 
reduced teaching loads and higher administrative costs) has been the increase in both number and 
diversity of clinical offerings at many law schools.  Clinical programs are extremely expensive to 
operate on a cost-per-credit basis, due to the extremely low student-faculty ratio necessary to 
accomplish clinical pedagogical objectives (typically around 8:1).38   Many law schools that 
would like to “require” all students to participate in a clinic, or at a minimum guarantee a clinic 
seat to every student who desires one, might find it prohibitively expensive to do so.  
One low-cost method of expanding the number of available seats in clinics is to hire 
recent law school graduates (preferably graduates who have excelled in that particular clinic) as 
“teaching fellows” for 6-12 months after their graduation.  This fellowship would serve as a form 
of apprenticeship for the recent graduate as she searches for full time employment. But because 
the fellow is also a licensed attorney, she would be available to help the faculty member 
supervise students on assigned cases.  Such assistance would allow the faculty member to 
increase enrollments in the clinic by perhaps 2-4 additional students per semester.  Clearly 
fellows are not substitutes for experienced clinicians, because they do not have the legal practice 
experience, the judgment, or the teaching skills to serve as a student’s primary case supervisor.  
But they could assist the faculty member in managing and directing a student’s caseload, 
including providing research direction and document review.  Viewing some recent graduates as 
perhaps an additional teaching resource in the clinics might be a low-cost way to increase the 
student faculty ratio from 8:1 to 11-1.  In return for their services, law schools might offer such 
fellows a modest housing stipend, or free courses in the school’s LL.M program.  This is another 
example of how law schools can be more creative in expanding their pie of available teaching 
resources in a way that does not add substantially to the tuition burden of students.  
G. Cut Back on Law Reviews   
There are presently 201 accredited law schools in the United States and over 650 student 
edited law journals—on average, over three journals per school.    Many schools host specialty 
journals in such areas as environmental law, cyber law, maritime law, etc.  At many law schools, 
students are paying tuition to serve on a specialty law journal, where they receive up to three 
credits per year for writing a note and engaging in editorial work such as source and cite 
checking.  While students undoubtedly receive some educational benefit from journal 
experience, the primary beneficiaries are the well-paid faculty members at other law schools who 
are finding a home for their scholarship.  This clearly represents a cross-subsidy.39   Flagship 
journals at many lower-ranked law schools, and even specialty journals at mid to top-tier law 
schools, are reaching to fill their books, and sometimes publishing “scholarship” of dubious 
value that does not significantly benefit the student editors, the host school or the profession.  
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39 Tamanaha, supra note 3 at 61. 
One study has suggested that up to 43% of law review articles published in the United States are 
never cited after publication by a single court or other scholar.40   
It is time for law schools to seriously reconsider whether all of their currently sponsored 
law journals are wise investments of valuable tuition dollars.  Are the students receiving a 
rigorous academic experience that will better prepare them for the practice of law? Are the 
journals publishing articles that are likely to have any influence in the legal profession?  Even if 
the answer to both of these questions is “yes,” might the same benefits flow from on-line rather 
than print publication? 41 Might many law schools—particularly lower ranked law schools that 
are struggling with enrollments-- be better off publishing only one flagship journal?   
It may cost a law school up to $25,000 annually to publish a specialty journal, including 
printing costs of multiple volumes per year and the apportioned salary and benefits of a 
professional staff member hired to manage business affairs.  For less than half that figure, law 
schools could open 30 seats in two new practical skills courses taught by experienced adjunct 
professors (such as advanced legal research or advanced legal writing) that might serve similar 
pedagogical objectives.  The students in such courses might receive an equal or even more 
formative educational experience, and the law school would save money. 
 This recommendation for close scrutiny of expenditures is not confined to law reviews.  
It is always difficult to raise questions about the value of existing programs.  Sacred cows are 
scattered across the legal academy.  Many programs have well-entrenched advocates and their 
own unique institutional histories. Yet these are exactly the sorts of difficult conversations that a 
wise steward of financial resources must undertake.  Law School Deans who are serious about 
curtailing the rising cost of tuition must scrutinize all aspects of their programs--from library 
subscriptions to administrative personnel to travel and catering –in order to identify those 
expenditures that have the least significant impact on our two primary educational missions -- the 
advancement of legal knowledge and the professional preparation of our students.  All 
operational and salary expenditures must be evaluated against these two critical benchmarks.   
III.  Conclusion 
The economic fuel that has sustained law schools for the past several decades has been 
the willingness of students to finance the high cost of their legal education through student loans, 
on the hope that they will obtain a six figure legal job upon graduation.  This bubble—much like 
the sub-prime mortgage bubble—is beginning to burst.42  As the percentage of graduates 
nationwide who obtained full time legal jobs requiring a J.D. shrunk last year to 55%,43 the 
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application pool has plummeted.   College graduates increasingly see law school as a very risky 
proposition.   
We are now facing a perfect storm of over capacity of seats, shrinking demand for legal 
services in several sectors of the legal profession,44 and a flawed economic model of the 
professoriate. Some have likened this crisis to the automotive industry in Detroit in the 1970s 
and to the steel industry in Pittsburgh in the 1980s.45  We ignore these challenges at our peril, 
and risk walking backwards over a precipice while pointing blindly to the responsibility of others 
in the system.  The law schools that are able to react nimbly and decisively to these changing 
demographics might state the most convincing case for attracting the precious tuition dollars of 
aspiring lawyers.  
I hope that nothing I have said in this essay will deter young people from pursuing a law 
degree.  Being a lawyer is an intellectually challenging and professionally satisfying career.  And 
the diverse legal needs of this nation’s citizens are certainly very compelling.  But the trends I 
have identified are real, and cannot be ignored.  If we are attentive to market indicators and the 
needs of our students, we may emerge from this economic downturn leaner, stronger and more 
focused on what matters most—providing a quality, affordable professional education to the next 
generation of America’s lawyers.  
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